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Summary 
“Time to build” models of investment expenditures play an important role in many 
traditional and modern theories of the business cycle, especially for explaining the 
dynamic propagation of shocks. We estimate the structural parameters of a time-to-build 
model using firm-level investment data on equipment and structures. For equipment 
expenditures, we find no evidence of time-to-build effects beyond one period. For 
structures, by contrast, there is clear evidence of time to build in the range of 2-3 years. 
The contrast between equipment and structures is intuitively reasonable and consistent 
with previous results. The estimates for structures also indicate that initial-period 
expenditures are low, and increase as projects near completion. These results provide 
empirical support for including “time to plan” effects for investment in structures. More 
generally, these results suggest a potential source of specification error for Q models of 
investment and production-based asset pricing models that ignore the time required to 
plan, build and install new capital. 
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Tobin’s Q theory of investment observes that the ratio of the marginal value of cap-
ital to its marginal cost (Tobin’s Q) ought to be unity for a value-maximizing ﬁrm.
Deviations from one are explained by capital adjustment costs, and give rise to an
equilibrium relationship between investment and Q. The theory assumes that capital
is the sole endogenous state variable. Empirically, this is a strong assumption. In
the presence of multiple capital types and/or time to plan, build and install capital
(TTB), the model no longer predicts a simple relation between investment and Q. In
our view, failure to account for these added margins is a leading explanation for the
empirical shortcomings of the Tobin’s Q model.
The Q theory generalizes to accommodate multiple capital types and TTB (Wildasin,
1984; Altug, 1989). But empirical estimates of models designed to accommodate both
features of the data — especially TTB — are surprisingly scant.2 Allowing both fea-
tures simultaneously is useful because it sharpens identiﬁcation. In particular, if TTB
is important, the magnitude of its eﬀects ought to be larger and statistically easier
to recognize for structures than for equipment. Since equipment and structures are
treated symmetrically in the model, there is no reason to expect spurious ﬁndings
for one over the other. Hence, if the predicted contrast in the magnitude of TTB is
supported by the data, then it is harder to attribute the results to spurious factors.
Our paper uses panel data on Italian ﬁrms to estimate a model that allows for
two capital types (equipment and structure), each with its own time to plan and
build. These data are well-suited to our purposes because they report stocks and
expenditures for equipment and structure separately. We investigate the multi-factor
TTB model derived in Altug (1993). Our empirical implementation follows the vector
autoregressive approach of Abel and Blanchard (1986), as modiﬁed for panel data and
2Papers that directly or indirectly estimate investment models with TTB include Altug (1989),
Oliner, Rudebush, and Sichel (1995), Peeters (1998), Christiano and Vigfusson (1999), and Koeva
(2001).
2multiple capital inputs by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995, 1998) and Bontempi, Del
Boca, Franzosi, Galeotti, and Rota (2004), respectively.
We ﬁnd strong evidence of time to build eﬀects for structures. Our estimates
of the structural parameters for time to build indicate that investment projects for
structures require 2-3 years from their initial planning to their ﬁnal completion. For
equipment, by contrast, we cannot reject a model in which all investment becomes
productive within a period of one year. These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with
evidence obtained from data at the project level (Montgomery, 1995b; Koeva, 2000),
ﬁrm level (Koeva, 2001), and aggregate macroeconomic data (Altug, 1993; Zhou,
1997).
The estimates for structures also indicate that expenditures are low initially, and
increase as projects near completion. These results provide empirical support for
including “time to plan” eﬀects for the structures component of investment, and
thus provide ﬁrm-level evidence complementary to the macroeconomic evidence doc-
umented in Christiano and Todd (1996), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and
Christiano and Vigfusson (2001).
Our ﬁndings are interesting for the following reasons. First, our results shed
light on well-known evidence of speciﬁcation error in existing estimates of investment
models. For one, investment is characteristically persistent, and existing research
shows this persistence is not easily explained. Empirical investigations of the Q model,
for example, typically report residual correlation in the error term. This ﬁnding is
consistent with (unmodeled) multiple capital types or TTB. Second, time to plan and
build also has important implications for models of production-based asset pricing (of
which Tobin’s Q model is a special case).3 In particular, it can explain why investment
appears ”insuﬃciently” sensitive to asset prices (e.g., interest rates or equity prices,
including Q ratios). The relative insensitivity to current price changes arises because
the current ﬂow of investment reﬂects not only expenditures for new projects, but
3Cochrane (1991) and Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003).
3also the completion of existing projects, the decisions for which were based on the
expectations of costs and beneﬁts formed in earlier periods.
Finally, modern business cycle models have diﬃculty accounting for the persistence
of output. Our evidence should be of value to research on business cycles because TTB
is one commonly cited source of persistence and cycles. Recent work by Christiano and
Todd (1996), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Christiano and Vigfusson
(2001) ﬁnds that allowing for “time to plan” (where initial periods are characterized
by low expenditures) is important for explaining the “hump-shaped” response of
investment expenditures to shocks. In related work, however, Rouwenhorst (1991)
argues that TTB plays only a secondary role in the propagation of shocks in the
calibration experiments in Kydland and Prescott (1982) (which assumed capital takes
four quarters to install, one fourth in each quarter). Further evidence is reported by
Cogley and Nason (1995), who argue that the quantitative role of TTB for shock
propagation is small. The results in the current paper suggest that these results may
be reconciled by the choice of calibration values. The above studies tend to assume
the time to plan and build is 3 to 4 quarters. By contrast, empirical work increasingly
suggests longer construction periods. Altug (1989) and Koeva (2000), for example,
s u g g e s tT T Bo nt h eo r d e ro f7t o1 2q u a r t e r s .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ho u rﬁndings.
Our evidence suggests that TTB is on the order of 12 quarters for structures (at least
in Italy), versus less than a year for equipment expenditures. It remains an open
question whether these larger values would be enough to produce interesting shock
propagation in business cycles models like those calibrated, for example, by Cogley
and Nason (1995).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
research on time to build. In Section 2 we lay out the model of optimal investment
decisions in heterogeneous capital under time to build. Section 3 describes the data
set. In Section 4 we discuss the estimation methodology and present the empirical
results. In Section 5 we interpret the structural parameters. Section 6 concludes.
42 The Investment Model with Heterogenous Cap-
ital Under Time-to-Build
When relating ﬂows to stocks of capital goods, the standard assumption in the in-
vestment literature is that one unit of investment at time t yields an additional unit
of capital stock in the same period. An alternative that is sometimes considered as-
sumes that a unit of investment adds to the stock only in period t +1 .T h i s c a s e ,
which implies that investment becomes productive with a lag, is usually referred to
as one-period delivery lag. Of course, longer lags are possible, but with annual data
that is the case most often entertained.
The time-to-build model postulates that it takes a number of periods (greater
than one) for an investment project to be completed. Following Altug (1993), let Pt
denote the real size of a capital project initiated in period t.E a c h p r o j e c t t a k e s τ
periods to complete; additions to time t capital stock equal projects started in period
t − τ.T h u s :Kit =( 1 − δ)Kit−1 + Pit−τ (δ is the i-th ﬁrm’s capital depreciation
rate). Let φh denote the proportion of the value of a project that is put in place
h periods after the start, with φh ≥ 0 (h =0 ,1,...,τ)a n d
P
h φh =1 .F i n a l l y ,
letting It be the value put in place during period t from all projects under way at
that time, we have: It =
Pτ
h=0 φhPt−h.B e c a u s ed i ﬀerent capital goods are likely to
be characterized by diﬀerent completion patterns, it is important to consider optimal
investment decisions with many capital inputs.
We embed the TTB hypothesis in a model of optimal investment decisions in
individual capital goods. Consider a ﬁrm which, at time t =0 , decides the optimal
size of projects in the various capital inputs in order to maximize the expected present


















5subject to the constraints (j =1 ,...,J):






where i indexes the ﬁrm and j the capital input whose stock is denoted by Kj, θ is a
shock to proﬁts, β is the real discount rate, Π(.) indicates current short run proﬁts,
cj(.) represent the adjustment cost functions, pj the acquisition price of capital goods,
and ξj are shocks to individual adjustment costs. Et is the expectations operator
conditional on information available at t. This set may or may not include time t
variables. The price of each capital good is normalized by the output price. We
assume that variable inputs are always at their optimal level; in order to simplify
the notation we omit the explicit dependence of the proﬁt function on variable input
prices.
Substituting the two constraints into the objective function and optimizing with




























tµj,it + Et(1 − δj)β
t+1µj,it+1 =0 (5)
At the optimal level of starts, condition 4 states that the expected cost of acquiring
and installing one unit of capital over the next τ periods equals the expected shadow
value of the marginal addition to the capital stock when the project comes on line,
µj. Both the cost and the shadow value are discounted back to period t.T oo b t a i n
an expression for this shadow value we ﬁrst divide by β
t a n dt h e nl e a dc o n d i t i o n5τ



















This expression states that the time t + τ shadow value of a unit of j-th capital,
expected and discounted at time t, equals the present value of proﬁts generated by a
unit of undepreciated capital from t+τ o n w a r d .E x p r e s s i o n6c a nb ec o m b i n e dw i t h
4, divided by β



















∂Ij,it+1 + pj,it+1 + ξj,it+1
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After having exogenously set the maximum time period of TTB, τ, expression 7 is
amenable to econometric estimation once we parametrize adjustment costs and relate
the expected shadow value of capital on the left hand side to observed variables.
Taking up this last aspect ﬁrst, we follow Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) by constructing the shadow value of capital from fundamentals,
which is hence named “Fundamental Q.” This is obtained by specifying a linear
forcing process for a vector of variables observable to the econometrician and useful
to forecast the expected marginal proﬁtability of capital. The important feature of
this approach is that it does not require knowledge of the stock market valuation of
the ﬁrm and is therefore applicable to unlisted companies as in our case.
Next we generalize this approach to the case of heterogeneous capital, as in Bon-
tempi, Del Boca, Franzosi, Galeotti, and Rota (2004). To construct the expectations
of the future marginal proﬁtability of capital appearing in 6, we assume that the
ﬁrm’s technology is Cobb-Douglas. Under perfect competition in the output market,









where ρj,i is the output elasticity of capital. In equation 8, the marginal proﬁtability
of each capital input is proportional to the corresponding average proﬁtability. If,















ρj,i with ηi representing the ﬁrm level
price elasticity of demand. In this case the marginal proﬁtability of each capital input
is proportional to the corresponding sales to capital ratio.
Consider now a vector xj,it comprised of capital-speciﬁc operating income to capi-
tal and sales to capital ratios and any other variables containing information which is
useful for forecasting the future marginal proﬁtability of capital. More precisely, the
vector xj,it contains the right hand side of 8 and 9, i.e. the operating income based
and the sales based marginal proﬁtability of each capital good. Following Gilchrist
and Himmelberg (1995) we allow for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in the
forcing process for xj,it by introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁcm e a n s( ﬁxed eﬀects) to allow the
conditional mean to vary arbitrarily across ﬁrms. We also introduce a time speciﬁc
component to the conditional mean to capture common movements in fundamentals
c a u s e db yt h eb u s i n e s sc y c l e( a g g r e g a t es h o c k s ) .W ea s s u m et h a txj,it follows a sta-
tionary stochastic process with a ﬁnite-order autoregressive representation that we
write in its AR(1) companion form:
xj,it = Ajxj,it−1 + fj,i + dj,t + uj,it (10)
where Aj is the matrix of capital speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients. Cross sectional heterogeneity
8is captured by a vector fj,i of ﬁrm unobservable ﬁxed eﬀects, while dj,t is a vector
of shocks common to all ﬁr m sf o rw h i c hw ea s s u m eaﬁnite-order autoregressive rep-
resentation. Finally, uj,it is a vector of disturbance terms that are orthogonal to
xj,it−1.
Assume that variables dated t are part of the information set used to forecast
future variables. Since we are assuming a stationary process and a ﬁnite-order au-
toregressive representation for both xj,it and dj,t, then the expectation of xj,it+s+τ




where we have omitted the terms involving fj,i and dj,t which result to be nuisance
parameters in the subsequent analysis. The expected shadow value of capital on the
left hand side of 6 may then be approximated by a variable which we call Fundamental





























where λ =( 1−δ)β. Letting operating income be the ﬁrst element of xj,it, c is a vector
with the ﬁrst element equal to one and zeros elsewhere, under perfect competition.4
We equate Fundamental Q as given above to the right hand side of 7 and parametrize
4If we assume that variables dated t are not part of the information set, the formula of Funda-
mental Q in 11 is slightly diﬀerent. In particular, the expectation of xj,it+s+τ given xj,it−1 may
be written as E [xj,it+s+τ|xj,it−1]=A
s+τ+1
j xj,it−1, so that Fundamental Q becomes: FQj,it+τ =





j xj,it−1. If we compute Fundamental Q in this way, the empirical results of
the regressions reported in the next sections are somewhat inferior but the main conclusions hold
true.
9adjustment costs by means of standard quadratic, linear homogenous functions of
investment and capital stock. In addition, we replace expected values with realizations
thereby introducing forecast errors up to period t + τ.B e c a u s ew ed on o th a v eﬁrm-
speciﬁc observations on the prices of new capital goods, we neglect the pj,it+τ’s and
let the ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects capture also their evolution. Letting aj be the
parameter summarizing the marginal adjustment cost associated to the j-th capital
type, we obtain the ﬁnal equation we estimate for each capital input:

















+ υj,i + νj,t + ²j,it.
In 13 the terms υj,i and νj,t represent the composite ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and time eﬀects
resulting from the substitution of equation 12 into 7; the error ²j,it includes both the
shock to adjustment costs, ξj,it, and the error introduced by replacing the present
value of future marginal proﬁts of each type of capital goods with its proxy obtained
through the VAR auxiliary forecasting model.
One assumption that is sometimes considered is that of delivery lags, which posits
that time has to pass before new capital is delivered. This implies that it gets added to
productive capital with a lag. Although some confusion in the terminology is present
in the literature, we concur with Peeters (1996, 1998) who deﬁnes “gestation lags”
both the case in which time passes before capital goods are “constructed” (Time-to-
build) and/or delivered (Delivery Lags). Aside from this, a standard assumption is
that of one-period delivery lag, which results in the following relationship between
investment and capital stock: Kit+1 =( 1− δ)Kit + Iit. If we embed this assumption
in our TTB approach, we obtain that the optimal ﬁrm’s program is now subject to
the constraint Kit+1 =( 1− δ)Kit + Pit−τ. In this case the relevant Fundamental Q
10expression is slightly diﬀerent. More precisely, we have:
FQj,it+τ = c






We will estimate the investment relationship 13 also under the above speciﬁcation of
Fundamental Q.5
3D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
We use data from Italy’s Company Accounts Data Service (CADS), a large database
with information on the balance sheets and income statements of more than 52,000
Italian ﬁrms covering all industries from 1982 to 1995. In addition to company ac-
counts the database contains information on ﬁrm demographics, location, sector, type
of organization, ownership status, the composition of the board of management and
the board of auditors. CADS is well representative of the population of Italian com-
panies, covering over 50% of the value added produced by the ﬁrms included in the
Census of the Italian Central Statistical Oﬃce. In Appendix A.1 we report variable
deﬁnition and construction.
The original data set comprised 5,086 manufacturing ﬁrms over 1982-1995; after
omitting ﬁrms with incomplete or problematic records we were left with a balanced
panel of 1,539 companies for the 1985-1995 period.6 This subsample remains repre-
sentative of the original data set.7 Consistently with the Italian industrial structure,
our data mostly cover non-listed companies: in the ﬁnal sample out of 1,539 units
only 0.32% is listed on the stock exchange. According to the national ﬁgures, only
5Of course, if only dated t−1 variables are in the information set, then Fundamental Q becomes:






6T h em a i nr e a s o nw h yw ea r el e f tw i t h1 5 3 9ﬁrms is the need to have companies with continuous
records on equipment and structure and, separately, on purchases and sales of those assets.
7Only ﬁrms which have been in receipt of a bank loan at the initial date are tracked. This
introduces a possible speciﬁcation bias through the exclusion of new and/or ﬁnancially weak ﬁrms.
Firm mortality is very low and is unlikely to be problematic.
110.13% of Italian manufacturing companies were listed on the Stock Exchange in 1995.
This is the main justiﬁcation for adopting the Fundamental Q approach to model
investment in Italy. Another aspect of our data set is the inclusion of a high number
of small and medium ﬁrms. These are predominant in Italy: on average the Italian
manufacturing limited liability companies have 44 employees. The average number
of employees in our ﬁnal sample is 166 employees with 30.2% of the companies have
less than 50 employees.8
We deﬁne net investment as purchases minus sales of ﬁxed capital, and gross
investment as purchases only; unlike gross investment, net investment may take neg-
ative values, when capital sales are larger than purchases. Table A.2.1 in Appen-
dix A.2 presents the summary statistics for the variables we use: net investment
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S ), real sales (S/KT,S/K E,S/K S), and operat-
ing income (Π/KT,Π/KE,Π/KS). All these variables are divided by the stock of total
capital (T), equipment (E), and structures (S).9 The positive skewness suggests that
investment is temporally concentrated; in particular, this is true for structures which
exhibit a zero net investment rate in the ﬁrst quartile. Purchases follow a similar
pattern. Most of the disinvestment is small and have a markedly skewed distribution,
with the highest degree in the case of structures. The mean annual rates of disinvest-
ment are as low as 0.037, 0.040 and 0.035 respectively, with an even lower median,
strongly aﬀected by the high number of zero episodes. Given the high frequency of
positive outliers due to the skewness of our data, we use pseudo-standard deviation
which is a more robust as a measure of variability.10
8In Table A.2.2 in Appendix A.2 we report the distribution of ﬁrms by industry and size.
9We measure the stocks of equipment and structures as they are reported on the ﬁrm’s balance
sheet. Strictly speaking, the time-to-build model would not include “work in progress” as part of
the capital stock since those capital expenditures are not yet productive. Incorporating the true
measure would require a complex, nonlinear estimation techniques. Since work in progress is a
relatively small fraction of the total stock, and because it appears in the denominator of a relatively
small ratio, the eﬀect on measured investment rates is likely small. It is therefore unlikely that is
has much eﬀect on our results, although we do not produce evidence for this conjecture.
10The pseudo-standard deviation is deﬁned as the ratio of the interquartile range (q3-q1)a n d
124 Estimation and Empirical Results
We estimate our investment model using a two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage we
estimate a VAR model for each type of capital good and calculate the corresponding
Fundamental Q. In the second stage we estimate the individual investment equations
as functions of the Fundamental Q’s previously obtained.
We adopt a bivariate VAR of order two speciﬁcation and estimate the coeﬃcient
matrices Aj’s in equation 10 for aggregated capital, equipment, and structures. The
vector xj,it comprises the two measures of the marginal proﬁtability of capital, based
on operating income and sales, as in the right hand side of equations 8 and 9. Follow-
ing Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), the technology and demand parameters, ρj,it







































(rit + δj,ht) (16)
where j indicates the type of capital good, h denotes industry, NhT is the number of
observations by ﬁr ma n dy e a ri ni n d u s t r yh, δj,ht is the rate of physical depreciation
which varies by industry and time, and rit i st h er a t eo fi n t e r e s to nﬁnancial debt.





The VAR model is estimated using DPD for Ox following Doornik, Arellano, and
Bond (2002), which essentially applies an eﬃcient GMM estimator to the equation
transformed by ﬁrst diﬀerences to eliminate ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects. Common time shocks
are eliminated by including time dummies, and the estimates of the standard errors
are consistent under heteroskedasticity.
1.349 where 1.349=2*0.674 is the interval containing 50% of the cases in a normal distribution.
13The parameter estimates of the VAR and associated diagnostics are reported in
Table A.4 of the appendix. This table is divided into three parts. The headings refer
to the capital stock used in the denominator of the variable ratios included in the
VAR. For example, in the ﬁrst panel, (Π/K)t and (S/K)t indicate operating income
and sales scaled by the aggregate capital stock. In the second and third panels, K
consistently refers to equipment and structures, respectively. Sargan’s test of over-
identifying restrictions is reported for each equation. Values statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the ﬁve and one percent levels (two-tailed) are denoted by two and one
asterisks, respectively. Table A.4 also reports AR(1) and AR(2) tests for serial corre-
lation in the residuals. The diﬀerencing transformation used by DPD to remove the
ﬁxed-ﬁrm eﬀects induces ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the errors. Longer lags ought
to be zero if the underlying model errors are mutually orthogonal. This predicted pat-
tern in the diagnostics is strongly conﬁrmed by the results, suggesting an adequate
VAR speciﬁcation for the time series process of the vector {(Π/K)t ,(S/K)t}.
The second stage of this approach uses the estimated elements of the VAR matrices
b Aj’s to construct the Fundamental Q’s. The term λj varies according to the type of
capital, and it is equal to 0.8614 for total investment, 0.8394 for equipment and 0.8944
in the case of structures.11 Armed with these ingredients, we set the maximum TTB
period equal to three and present estimates for this and the lower order cases. We
consider four alternative speciﬁcations of the unrestricted Fundamental Q model, the
cases corresponding to τ =0 ,1,2, and 3. For the case τ =3 , for example, the model












t∈T βit(1 − δj,ht),w h e r eH is the total number of industries. The discount
rate βit is calculated as [1+(1−τt)rit−zht]−1 where τt is the statutory tax rate on ﬁrm proﬁts, and
zht is the inﬂation rate (see Appendix A.1 for variable deﬁnitions). We follow Abel and Blanchard
(1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) who consider the average across ﬁrms and over time
of the discount factor and assume that ﬁrm-speciﬁc and year-speciﬁce ﬀects in the λ’s are captured














+ fj,i + νj,t + ξit. (17)
where b0=ajφ0,b 1=ajφ1β,b 2=ajφ2β
2 and b3=aj(1−φ0−φ1 −φ2)β
3.W ee s t i m a t et h e
investment equation 17 for aggregated capital, equipment, and structures distinguish-
ing between net investment (purchases minus sales) and gross investment (purchases
only). As in the VAR, we use GMM in ﬁrst diﬀerences to take into account the pos-
sible correlation of the ﬁxed eﬀects. We include a vector of time dummies in order
to control for common aggregate shocks, for changes in tax code and for price varia-
tions in each capital good.12 The instruments used are lagged values of the ratios of
operating income, sales and investment to capital and time dummies. The eﬀective
estimation period is 1987-1995.
The estimation results of the unrestricted models are reported, along with diagnos-
tic statistics, in appendix Tables A.6-A.8. These tables report only the reduced-form
parameters, which are not of direct interest, so we do not discuss them here; instead
we will discuss the values of the structural parameters reported in Tables 1-3 below.
Before proceeding to that discussion, however, it is interesting to note the pattern of
speciﬁcation tests across the four columns of Table A. 6. First, Sargan’s test rejects
all eight speciﬁcations. However, the pattern is interesting. In the ﬁrst column, the
speciﬁcation assumes τ =0 . Sargan’s test is 170.6, which rejects the model at the
one percent level. Moreover, the t-test for autocorrelation at the second lag has a
value of 2.968, which rejects zero. Whatever the source of speciﬁcation error, this test
suggests that it results in (unmodeled) correlation in the residuals.
The second column relaxes the speciﬁcation to allow for τ =1 ,t h a ti s ,t h et i m e
12The estimated coeﬃcients, not reported, capture in all the equations the signiﬁcant eﬀect on
marginal proﬁtability and investment of the recession which occurred in 1991-1993 and of the boost
in investment generated by the ”Tremonti law”(ﬁrms which in 1994-1995 were investing an amount
greater than the average over the previous ﬁve years were entitled to a 50% tax reduction on the
excess).
15to plan and build is allowed to take up to one year. The data reject this model, too:
both Sargan’s test and AR(2) are statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent levels.
In columns three and four, however, the evidence against the model drops somewhat
as the time to build is extended to two and three periods, respectively. Sargan’s
statistic still rejects, but has fallen to levels of 112.2 and 97.89. The AR(2) t-statistic
has is somewhat lower, too, at values of 1.607 and 2.438. In all, these tests reveal an
ill-ﬁtting model.
For the sake of completeness, the second half of the table (in columns 5-8) report
results using net rather than gross investment. The usual stories for adjustment costs
and time to plan and build are more consistent with gross investment than net, so
we prefer the speciﬁcation in columns 1-4, but for the record, these estimates tell a
similar story. Sargan’s test rejects in all cases, and for two of the four speciﬁcations,
the AR(2) statistic rejects. For the remainder of the discussion in this section, we
discuss only the results for gross investment, but for the reader’s convenience we
report results for both gross and net investment.
Tables A.7 and A.8 report estimates for the disaggregated investment model. Ta-
ble A.7 reports equipment investment, and Table A.8 reports structures investment.
These models fare better by the speciﬁcation tests. Sargan’s test rejects in all cases,
but in the models that do not allow for TTB, there is more evidence against the mod-
els for structures than equipment. In column 1 of Table A.7, for example, Sargan’s
statistic is 129.1 for equipment, whereas in Table A.8 for structures it is 183.1. As we
relax the model speciﬁcation, the ﬁt improves considerably, and the model for struc-
tures beneﬁts more than the model for equipment. For structures, the AR(2) statistic
does not reject zero for speciﬁcation involving τ > 0. The results for equipment are
less stable. For τ =1or τ =2 , this test rejects with values of 4.402 and 4.027, but
for τ =0or τ =3 , it fails to reject (values of 0.911 and 0.108, respectively).
For more clues on the ﬁt of these models, we can also inspect the statistical
signiﬁcance of the parameter coeﬃcients reported in the upper half of each of the
16tables. For equipment (Table A.7), as we move from column 1 to columns 2-4, there
is very little evidence to support alternatives to a null hypothesis τ =0 .F o rs t r u c t u r e s
(Table A.8), however, the additional parameters introduced by models with τ > 0
are almost always diﬀerent from zero at statistically signiﬁcant levels. In the model
assuming τ =1in column 2, for example, the reduced form coeﬃcient on (I/K)t+1
is 0.661 (0.105), where the standard error is reported in the parentheses. When the
model is further relaxes to allow τ =2 ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on (I/K)t+1 drops to 0.498
(0.101), while the now unrestricted coeﬃcient on the (I/K)t+2 rises to 0.651 (0.119).
The best ﬁt for structures, however, appears to be the case τ =3reported in column
4. All for coeﬃcients on the current and three forward lags of I/K are positive and
precisely estimated. As usual, the Sargan test rejects, but the AR(2) and AR(3)
easily fail to reject zero, while the AR(4) value indicates weak evidence against the
model.
In summary, we ﬁnd that when TTB is increased up to a period of three years,
model ﬁt improves substantially for structures investment. For equipment investment,
however, the improvement in model ﬁt is modest to none. These results are consistent
with our prior beliefs about the time required to plan, build and install new structures
as opposed to new equipment.
175 Interpretation of the Structural Parameters
Conditional on model performance, discussed in the preceding section, we can now
examine the structural parameters implied by the estimated models. Adjustment cost
and TTB coeﬃcients are presented for the cases in which the maximum number of
years for TTB goes from zero to three. Table 1 reports the evidence for the case of
aggregate investment, while tables 2 and 3 disaggregate total capital into equipment
and structures respectively. For each case both gross investment (asset purchases)
and net investment (purchases net of sales) are considered.
As seen in the previous section, a long TTB - up to the maximum length of three
years - seems to describe well the case of structures, whereas equipment has either a
zero or a one period TTB. The case of aggregate investment is less clear, though the
ﬁndings just mentioned make clear that looking at aggregate investment makes little
sense. One reason for considering nonetheless the aggregate case is because most, or
nearly all business cycle models making use of the TTB concept only consider total
capital stock.
A ﬁrst consideration concerns estimated adjustment costs. The model considered
here retained the assumption of quadratic, convex cost structures. We can see the
coeﬃcient a is always positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Hence convexity of ad-
justment costs cannot be rejected. In terms of magnitude of the parameter, we note
that for aggregate and equipment investment it declines as we increase the maxi-
mum length of TTB, while the opposite occurs for structures. For instance, in the
TTB(3) case for structures the adjustment cost parameter is equal to 1.537 (case of
purchases). This is markedly lower than the value of 5.26 reported by Bontempi et
al. (2003), which is the study more directly comparable to the present one.13 In the
light of the very high coeﬃcients of the literature using stock-marked based measures
of (average) Q, our ﬁnding is very reasonable as it implies that the cost of adding
13See Bontempi et al. (2003) for a brief discussion of the evidence in the literature concerning the
size of estimated adjustment costs in Q-investment equations.
18to the existing stock a dollar of structures entails an extra cost of 27 cents.14 As
for equipment, adjustment costs are found to be smaller than those characterizing
structures, as expected. However, the decreasing magnitudes of this coeﬃcient as
we move toward higher order TTB technologies makes them less and less reasonable,
something that goes along with the worsening overall performance of the estimated
model. Thus, a reasonable value of adjustment costs for equipment is 0.743 in the
TTB(1) case (for purchases), corresponding to 22 cents of adjustment costs per dollar
of additional equipment.
We now turn to examine the φi parameters, which are those we are mostly con-
cerned with in this paper. Kydland and Prescott (1982) ﬁrst showed that allowing
for TTB proved important for business cycle analysis. Short of empirical evidence,
or for the sake of simplicity, they assumed that completing new investment projects
takes a maximum of four quarters and that payments are equally distributed over
this period of time, so that φi =0 .25. Moreover, they considered a single aggregate
capital asset. In fact, even before those authors’ contribution, some evidence based on
surveys was available. Analyzing the nonresidential structures of 110 U.S. companies
in 1954, Mayer (1960) found the average period from start to completion of a typical
project to be ﬁve quarters. In addition, between decisions to build and completion
seven quarters elapsed. Using Census data, Taylor (1982) considered nonresidential
buildings in U.S. manufacturing industries requiring up to three years to complete.
He found that a major fraction of the value put in place occurs in the initial periods,
i.e. for two (three) year projects 81% (85%) of resources are expended in the ﬁrst
(ﬁrst two) year(s). Montogomery (1995) ﬁnds that the average completion period is
16,7 months in a survey of U.S. Department of Commerce data for a long period of
time (1961-1991). Peeters (1996) studies new plants in the Dutch industry during the
14This calculation is made at the mean value of the investment ratio for structures. Note also
that traditional Q investment equations produce estimates of the reciprocal of the adjustment cost
parameter a. Because our model has instead Fundamental Q on the left hand side we obtain a direct
estimate of that parameter.
19period 1990:2-1991:4 and ﬁnds the TTB is more than two years in this case. Finally,
Koeva (2000) analyzes structures in a sample of 106 U.S. companies. The average
length for completion is two years in most industries with 86 months in utilities and
just 13 months in the rubber industry.
The alternative route to characterize TTB technologies rests on the estimation
of the parameters of a structural model, a strategy also followed here. Most studies
in this area, however, use aggregate data, thus casting doubts on the realism of
the evidence so obtained. Altug (1989) assumes a TTB process for structures of
maximum four quarters, while equipment is treated in the standard way. On aggregate
quarterly U.S. data for 1948-1985 he estimates increasing values for the φi,s u g g e s t i n g
that a declining proportion of resources are allocated to investment projects close to
completion. More speciﬁcally, 70% of the resources needed to complete a given project
are expended in the ﬁrst two quarters. Same assumptions are made by Palm, Peeters,
and Pfann (1993) who use quarterly total manufacturing data for the U.S. over the
period 1960-1988. The authors ﬁnd that the TTB parameters are all positive and
signiﬁcant and display a hump-shaped distribution. The U.S. private business sector
forms the basis of the investigation by Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1995), which
assumes a four-quarter TTB both for equipment and for structures. The data cover
the years 1952-1992. Both types of capital assets have all the coeﬃcients signiﬁcant
and both cases are characterized by declining weights. Peeters (1998) carries out an
international studies, based on quarterly manufacturing data for the U.S., Canada,
U.K., West Germany, France, the Netherlands for the periods 1960-1990 or 1970-1990.
A TTB(1) (a one-period ”delivery lag”) is assumed for equipment and a TTB(3) for
structures. The author ﬁnds all parameters signiﬁcant, with declining magnitudes
for Canada, U.K., West Germany, and France. A U-shape instead characterizes the
U.S., while a hump shape applies to the Netherlands. Finally, using quarterly data
over 1949-1991 for the U.S., Zhou (2000) rejects the zero TTB hypothesis. He then
assumes either a four or a six quarters maximum TTB. These two cases provides a
20distribution which is declining as we approach completion in the former case, and
U-shaped in the latter.15
Koeva (2001) is the only econometric study of investment under TTB conducted
at the ﬁrm level. The author uses U.S. Compustat data for the years 1974-1996 and
assumes a maximum two year TTB. Based on this assumption, only the manufactur-
ing companies belonging to industries which, from previous analysis, have at most
a TTB(2), are selected for the ﬁnal sample, which consists of 528 ﬁrms. The study
considers only aggregate investment and estimates a TTB-augmented Euler equation
with quadratic adjustment costs. The TTB parameters are statistically signiﬁcant
and equal to φ1 =0 .05,a n dφ2 =0 .90, leading the author to conclude that the design
phase involves no large expenditures. Finally, the adjustment cost parameters, while
decreasing with the introduction of TTB relative to TTB(0), remains too large.
As we have just seen, with one exception, the available evidence is always based on
aggregate data. This is clearly unrealistic, and makes it diﬃcult to interpret the TTB
coeﬃcients. The second remark is that quarterly data are typically used. Finally, we
note that, with just an exception, the evidence is available only for the Unites States.
How do our ﬁndings compare with those of the papers surveyed above? The ﬁrst
notable result is that, in the case of Italian data, completion of projects takes up
to four years in the case of structures. One year seems instead to be suﬃcient for
equipment. The ﬁnding for structures may be unexpected when compared with other
studies. One likely explanation is the diﬀerent institutional setup of the country
relative to the U.S. (diﬀerent working practices, bureaucratic regimes, tax structure,
and so on). On the other hand, the above studies seem to have retained the original
Kydland and Prescott (1982) four quarter assumption, while being more interested
in assessing the uniform distribution of expenditures across periods. In this respect
our ﬁndings as far as structures are concerned interestingly suggest that the uniform
distribution may be a reasonable way of describing the TTB pattern. Indeed, if we
15The author states that results similar are obtained for an eight quarters TTB.
21look at columns (4) and (8) of Table 3 we see that the φ
0s are all between 0.2 and 0.3,
with the highest proportion (about 30%) of expenditures in the second year. In the
case of equipment, looking at columns (2) and (6) of Table 2, we see that in the ﬁrst
period about 15% of the expenditures are made, the rest being done in the following
and ﬁnal year.
Table 1
Estimated of Time-to-Build Parameters for Aggregate Investment
(Equipment plus Structures)
Structural Gross Expenditures Net Expenditures
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
a 1.144∗∗ 1.206∗∗ 1.235∗∗ 0.814∗∗ 1.476∗∗ 1.270∗∗ 1.095∗∗ 0.743∗∗
(0.190) (0.213) (0.258) (0.199) (0.178) (0.229) (0.262) (0.316)
φ0 0.367∗∗ 0.016 0.002 0.280∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.232∗
(0.083) (0.079) (0.072) (0.104) (0.112) (0.139)
φ1 0.280∗∗ 0.266∗∗ -0.219 -0.350
(0.092) (0.112) (0.249) (0.288)
φ2 0.614∗∗ 0.777∗∗
(0.814) (0.281)
Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
22Table 2
Estimated of Time-to-Build Parameters for Equipment
Structural Gross Expenditures Net Expenditures
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
a 1.259∗∗ 0.743∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.191∗ 1.606∗∗ 0.753∗∗ 0.326 0.253∗
(0.215) (0.115) (0.125) (0.104) (0.222) (0.146) (0.262) (0.151)
φ0 0.839∗∗ 1.891∗∗ 1.145∗∗ 0.894∗∗ 1.422 0.931∗∗
(0.150) (0.774) (0.486) (0.131) (1.224) (0.414)
φ1 -1.070 -0.290 -0.571 -0.218
(0.704) (0.364) (1.023) (0.269)
φ2 -0.003 0.077
(0.167) (0.173)
Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
Table 3
Estimated of Time-to-Build Parameters for Structures
Structures
Structural Gross Expenditures Net Expenditures
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
a 0.415∗∗ 0.877∗∗ 1.349∗∗ 1.537∗∗ 0.585∗∗ 1.051∗∗ 1.507∗∗ 1.698∗∗
(0.110) (0.165) (0.220) (0.218) (0.109) (0.198) (0.258) (0.230)
φ0 0.246∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.211∗∗
(0.093) (0.062) (0.054) (0.071) (0.077) (0.052)
φ1 0.369∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.361∗∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.043) (0.031) (0.070) (0.032)
φ2 0.301∗∗ 0.319∗∗
(0.034) (0.038)
Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
6 Conclusions
When looking at the structural parameters, this paper allows us to draw the following
interesting conclusions. First of all, it is important to distinguish between diﬀerent
capital assets. This study has conﬁrmed that equipment and structures are diﬀerent
in many respects, including the time it takes to build a new investment project. We
ﬁnd that equipment can be reasonably characterized by a one-period TTB: this case
23we can alternatively referred to as one-period gestation lag. On the other hand, it
takes up to four years to build structures, at least in the Italian institutional context.
This ﬁnding is clearly very diﬀerent from the evidence of the bulk of the literature,
which has typically looked at the U.S. case and made use of aggregate data, albeit
with quarterly frequency. The only ﬁrm level study assumes a maximum of two
years for the TTB in structures, while survey evidence suggests long periods required
for completing building projects. The average period is two years, with 86 months
required in the case of utilities. In the case of the pattern of expenditure installments,
we ﬁnd that the hypothesis of a uniform distribution across periods is a reasonable,
albeit approximate, description of reality. This ﬁnding is clearly in line with the
original assumption maintained by Kydland and Prescott (1982), but is at variance
with the patterns estimated by previous structural models.
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δT, δE, δS: depreciation rates of total ﬁxed assets, equipment and structures by year
and 2-digit manufacturing industry (ISTAT, Italian Statistical Oﬃce).
pT,p E,p S,pp,z: price indexes for investment in total assets, equipment and struc-
tures, output price and rate of inﬂation, by year and 2-digit manufacturing industry
(ISTAT).
r: actual interest rate on ﬁnancial debt (interest on bank loans, factoring and leasing







S : capital expenditures of total capital, equipment and structures (direct







S : sales of total capital, equipment and structures at the sale value.
We use the method proposed by Bond and Meghir (1994) in order to distinguish
between equipment and structures. We use the change in gross capital (end of period






e KE,it − e KE,it−1
e KT,it − e KT,it−1
IT,I E,I S: net investment in total capital, equipment and structures. Net investment
is computed as the diﬀerence between direct purchases and sales.
KT,K E,K S: replacement cost values of total capital, equipment and structures.
These values are estimated from historic cost accounts by using an iterative perpetual
inventory formula (modiﬁed in order to take into account the ”Visentini Law”, which
allowed ﬁrms to revalue the book values of their capital stock in 1982 and 1983):
Kj,it+1 = Kj,it (1 − δj,ht+1)(pj,ht+1/pj,ht)+Ij,it+1
where j = T,E,S; h indicate industry, and the initial Kj is equal to the net book
value in 1982 or 1983.
ST,S E,S S: real sales as a proxy for the nominal value of output deﬂated by the
output price index, pp.
ΠT,ΠE,ΠS: operating income as a proxy for marginal product of capital, deﬂated by
the output price index, pp.
28Table A.1
Descriptive Statistics
q1 Median q3 Mean Pseudo− s.dev. Skewness
I/KT 0.066 0.129 0.228 0.178 0.120 3.632
I/KE 0.065 0.157 0.289 0.221 0.166 4.199
I/KS 0 0.037 0.181 0.177 0.134 4.258
I/K
+
T 0.083 0.155 0.274 0.215 0.141 7.724
I/K
+
E 0.076 0.168 0.304 0.261 0.169 6.723
I/K
+
S 0.003 0.044 0.194 0.212 0.142 7.727
I/K
−
T 0 0.002 0.014 0.037 0.010 22.601
I/K
−
E 0 0.002 0.011 0.040 0.008 21.202
I/K
−
S 0 0.0001 0.004 0.035 0.003 32.118
S/KT 2.282 3.432 5.347 4.344 2.272 2.770
S/KE 3.472 5.565 9.451 7.910 4.432 4.223
S/KS 5.939 9.651 16.017 13.278 7.471 3.305
Π/KT 0.235 0.365 0.563 0.459 0.243 3.863
Π/KE 0.365 0.588 0.968 0.832 0.448 6.767
Π/KS 0.591 1.015 1.741 1.449 0.852 5.156
Table A.2
Distribution of Firms by Industry and Size
Industry No. of ﬁrms Frequency
Food, drinks and tobacco 167 10.85
Textile and clothing 177 11.5
Leather and footwear 31 2.01
Timber and wooden furniture 34 2.21
Paper and printing 82 5.33
Oil, chemicals and ﬁbres 128 8.32
Rubber and plastic 101 6.56
Minerals 116 7.54
Metal and metal goods 108 7.02
Mechanical engineering 384 24.95
Electric mat. and prec. instruments 93 6.04
Motor vehicles and oth. trans. equip. 36 2.34






Estimates of σj and ρj by industry
σj ρj
Industry Agg. Equip. Struct. Agg. Equip. Struct.
Food, drinks & tobacco 0.046 0.028 0.013 0.617 0.380 0.166
Textile & clothing 0.069 0.038 0.020 0.660 0.372 0.184
Leather & footwear 0.051 0.034 0.14 0.647 0.440 0.170
Timber & wooden furniture 0.095 0.055 0.027 0.844 0.495 0.231
Paper & printing 0.088 0.063 0.021 0.753 0.541 0.174
Oil, chemicals & ﬁbres 0.051 0.032 0.018 0.478 0.300 0.156
Rubber & plastic 0.082 0.049 0.022 0.712 0.425 0.190
Minerals 0.101 0.066 0.024 0.754 0.499 0.179
M e t a l&m e t a lg o o d s 0.072 0.047 0.020 0.701 0.468 0.193
Mechanical engineering 0.064 0.036 0.019 0.578 0.325 0.167
Electric materials
& precision instruments 0.065 0.039 0.018 0.479 0.286 0.131
Motor vehicles
& other transport equip. 0.064 0.038 0.015 0.587 0.333 0.137




Variables (Π/K)t (S/K)t (Π/K)t (S/K)t (Π/K)t (S/K)t
(Π/K)t−1 0.691∗∗ 0.016 0.588∗∗ -0.008 0.654∗∗ -0.013
(0.040) (0.022) (0.057) (0.037) (0.064) (0.033)
(Π/K)t−2 -0.029 -0.001 -0.055 -0.021 -0.020 0.009
(0.023) (0.015) (0.041) (0.034) (0.0387 (0.025)
(S/K)t−1 0.018 0.816∗∗ -0.071 0.636∗∗ 0.101 0.824∗∗
(0.048) (0.043) (0.076) (0.081) (0.079) (0.058)
(S/K)t−2 -0.104∗ -0.133∗∗ 0.006 -0.064 -0.081 -0.059
(0.038) (0.032) (0.055) (0.057) (0.069) (0.047)
no. of obs. 12312 12312 12132 12312 12312 12312
Sargan χ2 31.32 50.89 48.35∗∗ 60.66∗∗ 40.51 46.38∗
AR(1) -12.87∗∗ -8.46∗∗ -5.51∗∗ -6.48∗∗ -7.39∗∗ -7.35∗∗
AR(2) 0.40 -0.24 0.18 0.86 1.03 0.98
30Table A.5:
Guide to the Four Model Speciﬁcations Estimated in Table A.6-A.8
Model
Speciﬁcation Equation
TTB=0 FQ j,it = b0
Ij,it
Kj,it + fj,i + νj,t + ξit




Kj,it+1 + fj,i + νj,t + ξit






Kj,it+2 + fj,i + νj,t + ξit












Gross Expenditure Speciﬁcations Net Expenditures Speciﬁcations
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
It/Kt 1.144∗∗ 0.443∗∗ 0.020 0.001 1.476∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.172∗∗
(0.190) (0.118) (0.093) (0.061) (0.178) (0.103) (0.096) (0.067)
It+1/Kt+1 0.763∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.914∗∗ -0.240 -0.259
(0.207) (0.164) (0.099) (0.229) (0.222) (0.146)
It+2/Kt+2 0.869∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 1.109∗∗ 0.577∗∗
(0.166) (0.104) (0.208) (1.333)
It+3/Kt+3 0.096 0.254
(0158) (0.143)
no. of obs. 13842 12304 10766 9288 13842 12304 10766 9288
Sargan χ2
29 170.6∗∗ 165.6∗∗ 112.2∗∗ 97.89∗∗ 180.9∗∗ 166.1∗∗ 104.6∗∗ 90.45∗∗
AR(1) -5.084∗∗ -1.165 -1.436 —0.373 -7.152∗∗ -1.992∗ -2.625∗∗ -2.490∗
AR(2) -2.968∗∗ -3.133∗∗ -1.607 -2.438∗ -6.013∗∗ -3.035∗∗ 1.285 0.4365





G r o s sE x p e n d i t u r e sS p e c i ﬁcations Net Expenditures Speciﬁcations
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
It/Kt 1.259∗∗ 0.624∗∗ 0.510∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 1.606∗∗ 0.674∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.235∗∗
(0.215) (0.111) (0.095) (0.047) (0.222) (0.102) (0.082) (0.045)
It+1/Kt+1 0.119 -0.288∗∗ -0.055 0.080 -0.186∗∗ -0.055
(0.115) (0.117) (0.054) (0.103) (0.090) (0.055)
It+2/Kt+2 0.048 0.0006 0.048 0.019
(0.078) (0.032) (0.071) (0.036)
It+3/Kt+3 0.028 0.053
(0.032) (0.036)
no. of obs. 13842 12304 10766 9288 13842 12304 10766 9288
Sargan χ2
29 129.1∗∗ 113.6∗∗ 74.13∗∗ 74.57∗∗ 122.0∗∗ 115.0∗∗ 82.99∗∗ 70.39∗∗
AR(1) -5.785∗∗ -5.447∗∗ -4.507∗∗ -4.279∗∗ -5.965∗∗ -5.198∗∗ -4.849∗∗ -4.443∗∗
AR(2) -0.911 -4.402∗∗ 4.027∗∗ -0.108 -1.611 -4.802∗∗ 4.040∗∗ -0.125





Gross Expenditures Speciﬁcations Net Expenditures Speciﬁcations
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
It/Kt 0.415∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.585∗∗ 0.344∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.357∗∗
(0.110) (0.083) (0.097) (0.106) (0.109) (0.103) (0.111) (0.111)
It+1/Kt+1 0.661∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.706∗∗ 0.544∗∗ 0.344∗∗
(0.105) (0.101) (0.083) (0.101) (0.112) (0.096)
It+2/Kt+2 0.651∗∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.738∗∗ 0.542∗∗
(0.119) (0.090) (0.136) (0.107)
It+3/Kt+3 0.419∗∗ 0.455∗∗
(0.099) (0.105)
no. of obs. 13842 12304 10766 9288 13842 12304 10766 9288
Sargan χ2
29 183.1∗∗ 122.2∗∗ 67.94∗∗ 64.56∗∗ 171.7∗∗ 125.8∗∗ 64.89∗∗ 57.63∗∗
AR(1) -2.929∗∗ -3.555∗∗ -1.336 -0.363 -3.055∗∗ -2.881∗∗ -1.472 -0.201
AR(2) -3.438∗∗ -0.286 -2.535∗ -1.582 -4.014∗∗ -0.838 -2.506∗ -1.648
AR(3) -0.523 -0.363 -0.415 -0.297
AR(4) -2.431∗ -2.407∗
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